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JUDGES,

Judging and Otherwise

Do we ask too much of state court judges — or not enough?
BY MICHAEL C. POLLACK1

A

sk the average person to
imagine what
a judge does,
and the answer
will most likely
be something
right out of a courtroom from Law &
Order — or Legally Blonde, Just Mercy,
My Cousin Vinny, Kramer vs. Kramer, or
any of the myriad law-themed movies
and television shows. A judge is faced
with a dispute brought by some parties
and their lawyers and is charged with
resolving it, whether it be a breach of
contract, a tort action, a competing
claim over property, a disagreement
about the meaning of a statute, some
accusation that someone has committed a crime, and so on.
This basic conception of courts as
resolvers of disputes is not only popularly shared, but it also aligns neatly
with what is commonly taught in law
schools and with what most lawyers
come to think: A judge’s role is to dis-

passionately and evenhandedly apply
the rule of law to address the disagreements brought before them. But this
adversarial vision of the courts — particularly the state courts — is woefully
incomplete.
In every state, on top of this adversarial dispute-resolution function, state

State legislatures
need to make more
conscious choices
about structuring
the roles they assign
to state courts. And
until they do, judges
ought to reevaluate
for themselves how
they exercise these
deeply important roles
beyond judging.

court judges are charged with a broad
range of administrative, legislative, and
executive law enforcement functions.
These are not the mere odds and ends
of governing either; weighty interests like personal identity, autonomy,
liberty, reproductive freedom, even
electoral democracy, and more are at
stake. And yet in none of these settings
does the courtroom function like what
most people have come to expect.
This piece, like the longer law
review article on which it is based,
develops a more complete portrait of
state courts and examines whether
we should like what we see. Are the
substantial interests at stake in each
context appropriately served when
state court judges handle them in the
ways they are asked to? In some, yes.
But in others, there are serious reasons to be concerned. These are not
necessarily constitutional reasons,2 but
rather primarily institutional reasons
— rooted in efficacy, expertise, democracy, and fairness. And they do not

u
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arise because judges are necessarily
bad decision-makers in some absolute sense. Rather, they arise because
other components of government are
likely to be relatively better decisionmakers in particular arenas — more
expert, or with a superior balance of
responsiveness and remove, and so on
— or because judges operate with inadequate procedural constraints in these
arenas. As a result, state legislatures
need to make more conscious choices
about structuring the roles they assign
to state courts. And until they do,
judges ought to reevaluate for themselves how they exercise these deeply
important roles beyond judging.

JUDGES AS ADMINISTRATORS

Government institutions are routinely called upon to administer laws
and programs created by legislatures.
For example, such institutions carry
out legislative directives to determine — in nonadversarial proceedings
— whether people are eligible for certain benefits or licenses based on
statutorily defined criteria. The federal Social Security Administration
thus determines whether people qualify for disability benefits by reference
to specified metrics and, if they do,
awards those benefits. Similarly, local
parks departments might determine
whether applicants qualify to host
a concert or a rally in a park and will
grant permits to those who meet the
relevant standards. While one might
call this “adjudication” in the sense
that it involves applying law to facts,
it is not the act of resolving a dispute.
We generally call the institutions that
do this sort of legal administration
administrative agencies.
But throughout the nation’s history, state court judges have also been
directed by state legislatures to carry
out precisely these sorts of adminis-
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trative functions. Initially, the courts
were allocated these responsibilities
in the absence of what we now know
as the modern administrative state.3
Today, however, with robust administrative apparatuses, that allocation
often lacks justification. What we have,
therefore, can appear to be somewhat
random, lacking a unifying theory or
rationale and, as discussed at the end
of this piece, resulting in normatively
questionable practices.
Consider a few examples. First,
in nearly every jurisdiction, a person who wants to officially change his
or her name in circumstances other
than a change of surname due to marriage must file a petition before a state
probate, family court, or general jurisdiction county judge.4 And nearly all
states employ a process plucked from
the administrative context rather than
the dispute-centric context familiar
to ordinary judging: The judge makes
the decision by considering the representations in the applicant’s usually
unopposed petition — which generally
is required to state the applicant’s reasons for the desired change — in light
of the rules imposed by state law.5

Initially, the courts
were allocated these
responsibilities
in the absence of
what we now know
as the modern
administrative state.
Today, however, with
robust administrative
apparatuses, that
allocation often lacks
justification.

Once the judge reaches a decision, a
dissatisfied applicant can appeal to a
higher state court, but that court will
generally review the judge’s decision
under a highly deferential “abuse of
discretion” standard.6
Beyond this basic framework, however, one quickly finds that legislatures
have offered scant guidance. Some
state statutes provide that the judge
“shall” grant the name change unless
there are good reasons not to do so.7
Others adopt the opposite default and
provide that the name change shall be
granted only if the judge affirmatively
finds good cause to do so.8 A number of
other states simply provide that the
judge “may” grant the name change,
full stop.9 A handful go a step further
and provide that the judge “may” grant
the change upon a showing by the
applicant of good cause.10 And another
handful provide that the judge “may”
grant the change if there is no good
reason not to do so.11 Many states leave
it up to the judge to determine what
those reasons and good causes might
be,12 though a few explicitly define
what objections or grounds for change
might be reasonable.13 And almost no
states affirmatively require judges to
provide much of a record or justification for their decisions, a fact that
makes meaningful appellate review
more of a mirage than it is in the context of ordinary judging, or even than
it is in the context of ordinary administrative decision-making.
What this variation illustrates is that
there are numerous ways to structure
the judge’s role in this quasi-administrative judicial setting — ways to give
judges more or less bounded discretion — and some of them raise more
concerns than others, for reasons discussed in the last section of this piece.
Further complicating matters, state
court judges sometimes shake loose
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whatever statutory constraints exist
or bind themselves to new masts of
their own creation. For example, while
courts sometimes take seriously the
limited grounds for denial in their
state’s statutes and thus liberally grant
petitions,14 they also sometimes invent
further grounds for denial not listed
in those statutes.15 And while courts
sometimes embrace the broad latitude
to deny petitions afforded them by
their state’s statutes,16 they also sometimes conclude that there are “very
limited bases for denying a statutory
name change application” and that
“policy-based or philosophical objections to individual name changes” are
not proper grounds for denial.17
Next, consider another administrative role assigned to state court judges.
This one arises in the context of abortion. Many states have required a
parent to be notified of or to consent
to a minor’s decision to seek an abortion unless a government entity grants
an exception.18 In all but one such state,
the relevant government entity has
been a state court judge.19 Generally,
the minor is required to file an anonymous or pseudonymous petition with
the court setting out her desire to
bypass her parents and explaining why
she can make on her own the decision
to have an abortion.20 The judge is often
instructed to consider the petition ex
parte and to issue a ruling promptly,21
perhaps after holding a hearing.22
Though minors often have the right to
court-appointed counsel,23 attorneys
and child advocates understandably
describe the process as “daunting” and
“intimidating.”24
The statutory criteria that guide
judges are fairly similar across the
states. Most states provide that “any
judge of a court of competent jurisdiction shall” order that the requisite
parental involvement be waived “if the

29

Pure legislating —
setting policy outside
of resolving any
adversarial dispute,
and simply because
one believes it to be
wise — is a different
beast, and state court
judges do it, too.
judge determines that [such involvement] will not be in the best interest
of the minor, or if the court finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that
the minor is sufficiently mature to
decide whether to have an abortion.”25 Some states go further and list
specific factors that the judge must
consider — factors like the minor’s
age, intelligence, maturity, “emotional
development and stability,” and “credibility and demeanor as a witness.”26
And, in a departure from the namechange context, nearly all of these
states require the judge to include in
the order “specific factual findings and
legal conclusions in support thereof.”27
One last example of an administrative role handled by state court judges
is the regulation of attorneys. Every
state regulates and licenses various
professions like doctors, dentists, and
cosmetologists through administrative
agencies and boards, but the regulation
and licensure of attorneys is handled
by the state courts. In some states,
this regulatory power is grounded in
the state constitution28; in others, in
statutes29; and in others, in judicial decisions.30 But no matter the legal footing,
the often articulated rationales are the
same: Lawyers are officers of the court,
and only the courts can adequately

preserve the independence of lawyers
from the political legislatures.31 These
claims have no doubt long been contested,32 but the states still uniformly
rely on them either to farm out the
regulation of a profession to the courts
or to permit the courts to assert that
administrative power for themselves.

JUDGES AS LEGISLATORS

So far, we have seen judges administering the law by carrying out directives
to regulate and to grant licenses and
benefits. But judges also sometimes
make the law. That is, they legislate.
Of course, judges also “legislate” in
the context of common law decisionmaking, but common law judging is still
rooted in the resolution of adversarial disputes. Pure legislating — setting
policy outside of resolving any adversarial dispute, and simply because one
believes it to be wise — is a different
beast, and state court judges do it, too.
One example is the important and
increasingly controversial role that
judges play in redistricting — not only
in resolving litigation about redistricting, but also in actually drawing district
lines themselves.33 District maps are
statutes,34 and they reflect policy
choices.35 This is no doubt the reason
redistricting has consistently been
characterized by the U.S. Constitution
and the Supreme Court as a legislative function.36 And yet, in California,
Maine, Mississippi, New Jersey, and
Washington, state court judges are
explicitly made backup mapmakers. If
the legislature or relevant commission
cannot agree on a map in these states,
the map is drawn either by a group of
officials that includes a judge, or by a
panel of judges entirely on their own.37
That is, if the other responsible entities fail to produce a district map, the
state court will create its own — even
in the absence of a party seeking a judg-

u
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ment.38 In six additional states, courts
have the special remedial power in
the litigation context — where there
is a party seeking a judgment — to create their own redistricting maps upon
finding that a given map is unlawful.39
Another
important
example of judicial legislating is the
establishment of specialized courts
for particular offenses or particular
classes of defendants. These include
both “problem-solving” courts, like
drug courts, domestic violence courts,
and gun courts,40 and so-called “status
courts,” like girls courts or veterans
courts.41 Unlike ordinary courts, which
are established by legislative action,
these courts are generally created on
an ad hoc basis by judges themselves.42
In the pages of this very publication over 20 years ago, Judge Truman
Morrison expressed his “concern[]
about the power that judges have” to
create new courts and indicated that
he did not think that judges should be
free “to leave their traditional role and
be informed only by their own personal definition of what justice is.”43
“When you try and channel the energies of social change into the judicial
branch,” he cautioned, “it’s not a good
fit.”44 Judge Cindy Lederman similarly warned in the same article that,
if judges “accept this challenge, we’re
no longer the referee or the spectator. We’re a participant in the process
[which is] quite a leap. It’s not traditional.”45 Put another way, it’s not
“judging” — in the sense of resolving
disputes — but legislating.

JUDGES AS ENFORCERS

Last, in addition to administering and
making law, state court judges sometimes enforce law. Here, I refer to the
exercise of executive enforcement
discretion and, specifically, the choice
whether to prosecute an individual.

Vol. 106 No. 2

Legislatures should
consider reallocating
some administrative
roles to bona fide
administrative
agencies with the
necessary subject
matter expertise
and insulation from
electoral pressures.
In the common conception, the prosecutor enforces the law by choosing
whether and which charges to file,46
and the judge sits as arbiter. But in
19 states, trial court judges have the
power to unilaterally dismiss prosecutions on their own initiative.47 These
judges are instructed to do so not based
on an evaluation of the sufficiency of
evidence, but based on their own normative judgments about whether a
case ought to be pursued even if there
is ample evidence of guilt.48 In most of
these states, the power is capaciously
framed by statute as the power to dismiss prosecutions “in furtherance
of justice,”49 thus leaving this determination to the judge’s open-ended
discretion.50 However it is drawn, the
allocation of this power to the state
judiciary reflects a conscious choice by
legislatures to vest the courts with an
enforcement power typically wielded
by executive officials.51 And as Brooklyn
Law Professor Anna Roberts has cataloged, judges tend to take the view that
they maintain broad discretion in this
setting, rooting their decisions to dismiss prosecutions less in law and more
in the conclusion that the prosecutor
made the “wrong” choice.52

TOWARD BETTER JUDGMENT
BEYOND JUDGING

How should we feel about all of this?
First, some good news. As odd as some
of these nonjudicial roles might seem,
a few are relatively justifiable. As the
longer article on which this piece is
based explores in greater depth,53
though judges’ executive enforcement role usurps some prosecutorial
power, it can serve as a healthy check
by another actor with expertise in the
criminal legal system. And while there
might be some concern about judges
getting in the way of elected prosecutors carrying out their democratic
mandates, many state court judges are
likewise elected and thus accountable
to the public like prosecutors are.
Courts’ legislative roles are also
somewhat defensible, primarily because they are essentially gap-filling
or necessary “second-best” roles.54
Take redistricting: Legislatures themselves are hardly paragons of virtue
when it comes to fair redistricting,55 so
involving judges makes sense because
they have structural independence
from the legislature and personal independence from the consequences of
district lines, but they also have some
electoral accountability of their own.
And when it comes to specialized courts, it would surely be ideal if
legislatures could enact uniform solutions, rather than leaving it to judges
to make ad hoc changes. But at least
judges have expertise in the functioning of the criminal legal system, and at
least judge-led action does not exclude
the possibility of subsequent legislative action. Indeed, many judges who
have done work in this arena seem to
have done so not to arrogate power
but simply to fill a need left unmet by
legislators.56 Rather than quarrel with
these judicial roles, then, we ought to
understand them as decent enough
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substitutes while urging legislators to
legislate — and to look to experienced
judges for inspiration and guidance as
they do.
When it comes to the administrative roles state court judges serve,
however, the picture is decidedly less
sunny. Like the interests at stake in the
other roles, the interests implicated
here are weighty, deeply personal ones
that approach or implicate outright
constitutional guarantees. But here,
judges — for all of their strengths — are
substantially less well-suited to serve
these interests.
To see why, think carefully about
what sorts of qualities we want in
the gatekeepers for processes like
name changes or access to abortion
for young women. Do judges have the
right balance of independence and
accountability? Do they have sufficient
expertise in the subject matter? Do
they have a degree of individualized
discretion that is nonetheless bounded
by considerations set by policymakers?57 Can claimants seek meaningful
review of adverse decisions by some
higher authority?
The answer to all of these questions
is no. There is evidence that state court
judges who are elected and must face
reelection have shortcomings when it
comes to protecting vulnerable individuals.58 General jurisdiction judges
at best have no more expertise than
anyone else in something like name
changes and may affirmatively lack
necessary expertise in areas like child
welfare. And while the laws surrounding abortion access require judges to
articulate their findings and reasons,59
the same is not true with respect to
name-change decisions, which consequently resist meaningful appellate
review. Finally, speaking of the prospect of an appeal, while judges have
a stronger claim to expertise when it

31

comes to the admission and regulation
of attorneys, that role is handled primarily by state high courts. The result
is that there is no path to appeal to
another decision-maker.60
With these shortcomings in mind,
legislatures should consider reallocating some administrative roles to bona
fide administrative agencies with the
necessary subject matter expertise
and insulation from electoral pressures. The Department of Records, for
example, could process name-change
applications, and the Department of
Child Services could process parental
bypass petitions.
Short of such reorganization, however, legislatures ought to more
assertively limit the discretion judges
have when serving these administrative roles by providing explicit and
exclusive lists of criteria these judgesas-administrators must consider.61
This is especially critical in those states
where the statutory law discussed
above offers little in the way of guidance or guardrails.62 And where they
do not currently, legislatures ought to
require judges to give reasons when
rejecting these sorts of administrative
claims — both to enable meaningful
appellate review and because the very
act of reason-giving can improve the
quality of decision-making.63 These are
well-understood best practices in both
the ordinary dispute-resolution context — judges write opinions — and in
the ordinary administrative decisionmaking context, where the relevant
decision-makers are often required
by law to articulate the bases for their
decisions.64 Reasons ought to be similarly required when judges engage in
administrative decision-making.
In the meantime, judges can take
steps to better administer these functions. Even where statutes do not
require it, judges should impose upon

themselves reason-giving obligations
and should be clear about the factors
they are evaluating, why those factors
are worth considering, and why they
are or aren’t satisfied. For their parts,
appellate judges should review these
administrative decisions just as they
would ordinarily review the decisions
of other administrative decisionmakers: with something like substantial evidence review.65 Doing so need
not be particularly onerous — the
records in these cases would often be
straightforward — but it would still
encourage the judges making administrative decisions on the front lines to
more clearly root their determinations
in facts and articulated considerations.66 And it would allow applicants
to more fully air and more fairly vindicate their significant interests.

CONCLUSION

It is critical for lawyers, legislators,
scholars, and judges alike to see the
state courts for what they are: complex,
multifaceted institutions responsible
for a whole range of functions outside
of traditional “judging.” This richer
understanding should not only help
us better engage with the state courts
but also motivate us to ensure that
state law and higher courts shape the
architecture of decision-making one
function at a time, taking careful steps
to guide, review, or limit judges in the
ways that will best reflect the most
desirable decision-making processes
in each arena and that will best respect
u
the values and rights at stake.

MICHAEL C.
POLLACK is a
professor of law and
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The ideas contained in this piece were originally
published in greater detail as Courts Beyond
Judging, 46 BYU L. Rev. 719 (2021), and are
adapted here with thanks to the Brigham Young
University Law Review. I am grateful to Ben
Grunwald, Amelia Thorn, and Samuel Weinstein
for their comments and suggestions.
See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474,
482–83 (1968) (observing that the states have
permissibly taken a “varied, pragmatic approach
in establishing governments”).
See, e.g., Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the
“Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1833, 1871 (2001); Lawrence
Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the
Administration, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 76 (1994).
See, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 18-C, § 1-701(1) (2020);
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 547:3-i(I) (2003); S.C. Code
Ann. § 15-49-10(A) (1990); W. Va. Code § 48-25101(a) (2013); but see N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 101-2(a),
101-5(f) (2014–15) (providing that the clerk of the
court has the “duty” not to grant an application
if good reasons exist for denying it and that the
applicant may appeal the clerk’s decision to the
local judge, whose decision is “final” and not
appealable). Hawaii is the lone state in which
this process takes place outside the courts. See
Haw. Code R. §§ 2-2-2, 2-2-6 (1987) (directing
applicants to petition the lieutenant governor).
See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-601(A) (2011); Ga.
Code Ann. § 19-12-1(b) (2017); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 601402(a) (1990); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.270 (2017); Tenn.
Code Ann. § 29-8-102 (1978); but see La. Rev. Stat.
§ 13:4752 (2019) (providing for an adversarial
process in which the proceedings “shall be
carried on contradictorily with the district attorney,” whose role is to “represent the state”).
See, e.g., In re Mayol, 137 S.W.3d 103, 105 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2004); In re Parrott, 392 S.E.2d 48, 48 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1990); In re Reed, 584 S.W.2d 103, 104
(Mo. Ct. App. 1979); In re Hauptly, 312 N.E.2d 857,
860 (Ind. 1974).
See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 210, § 12 (1977); Minn.
Stat. § 259.11(a) (2005); Or. Rev. Stat. § 33.410
(1975); Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-217(C) (2015).
See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-15-101(2)(a) (2016);
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1402(c) (1990); Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 527.270 (1939); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,271(3)
(2018); S.D. Codified Laws § 21-37-5 (1960); Wyo.
Stat. Ann. § 1-25-101 (2013).
See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-11(a) (2014); Ind.
Code § 34-28-2-1 (2017); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 401.010
(2013); N.H. Rev. Stat. § 547:3-i(I) (2003); Tenn.
Code Ann. § 29-8-104 (1978).
See, e.g., D.C. Code § 16-2503(a) (2018); Mich. Comp.
Laws § 711.1(1) (2020); Ohio Rev. Code § 2717.01(A)(3)
(2013); Utah Code Ann. § 42-1-2 (1953); W. Va. Code
§ 48-25-103(a) (2007).
See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 10 § 5904(a) (2018);
735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/21-101(d) (2018); N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 40-8-1 (1989); Wisc. Stat. § 786.36(1) (2018).
See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 63 (2014).
See, e.g., Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 1634 (1953).
See, e.g., In re Harvey, 293 P.3d 224, 225 (Okla.
Civ. App. 2012) (reversing a trial court’s denial of
a name-change petition filed by a transgender
person in a state with a narrow-discretion statute because the statute provides that the only
permissible bases for such a denial are fraud
or illegality, neither of which is present when
one simply wishes to “identify[] oneself by a

traditionally male or female name while having
the DNA of the other sex”).
15
See, e.g., In re Dengler, 287 N.W.2d 637, 639
(Minn. 1979) (concluding that, notwithstanding
narrow statutory language, courts have “inherent authority to deny” a name-change petition
if the chosen name is “racist, obscene, or otherwise likely to provoke violence, arouse passions,
or inflame hatred,” even though none of those
conditions are present in the state’s statute).
16
See, e.g., In re Bobrowich, Index No. 159/02, 2003
WL 230701, at *3 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Jan. 6, 2003) (rejecting a petition to change one’s name to “Steffi
Owned Slave” in a state that does not tightly
define what makes an application unreasonable
because the judge feared that granting the petition would “attach the imprimatur of the court
to that individual’s political philosophy”).
17
In re Zhan, 37 A.3d 521, 524 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2012).
18
In Bellotti v. Baird, the Supreme Court held that
a state requiring parental involvement must
“provide an alternative procedure whereby
authorization for the abortion can be obtained.”
443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979). But the Court did not
require that that procedure run through the
state courts. Id. at 643 n.22 (“[A] State choosing
to require parental consent [may] delegate the
alternative procedure to a juvenile court or an
administrative agency or officer.”).
19
Maryland is the only state that has created a
bypass procedure that relies on a doctor’s judgment rather than a court’s. See Md. Code Ann.,
Health-Gen. § 20-103(c)(1) (1991).
20
See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-6705(c) (2014); La.
Stat. Ann. § 40:1061.14(B)(3)(a) (2017); Miss. Code
Ann. § 41-41-55(3) (2007).
21
See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 24, § 1784(c) (1995); Ga.
Code Ann. § 15-11-683 (2014); 750 Ill. Comp. Stat.
70/25(c) (1995).
22
See, e.g., Iowa Code § 135L.3(3)(c) (2015); Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 65-6705(c) (2014); Me. Stat. tit. 22, § 1597A(6)(C) (2020).
23
See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 20-16-809(b)(1)(B), (C)
(2016); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 132:34(II)(a) (2012);
Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 1-740.3(B) (2013); Tenn. Code
Ann. § 37-10-304(c)(1) (2020).
24
Kate Coleman-Minahan, Amanda Jean Stevenson, Emily Obront & Susan Hays, Young Women’s
Experiences Obtaining Judicial Bypass for Abortion in Texas, 64 J. Adolescent Health 20 (2019);
Molly Redden, This is How Judges Humiliate
Pregnant Teens Who Want Abortions, Mother
Jones, (Sept. 2014), https://www.motherjones.
com/politics/2014/10/teen-abortion-judicial-bypass-parental-notification/.
25
Colo. Rev. Stat. §13-22-707(1)(a) (2018); see, e.g.,
Ga. Code Ann. § 15-11-684(c) (2014); Iowa Code
Ann. § 135L.3(3)(e) (2015); Miss. Code Ann. § 4141-55(4) (2007); Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-10-304(e)
(2020).
26
Fla. Stat. § 390.01114(4)(c)(1) (2020); see, e.g., Kan.
Stat. Ann. § 65-6705(n) (2014); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
311.732(3)(e) (2005); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028(2)(2)
(2019); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3206(f)(4) (1992
27
Colo. Rev. Stat. §13-22-707(1)(a) (2018); see also
Iowa Code § 135L.3(3)(f) (2015); Miss. Code Ann. §
41-41-55(5) (2007); Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-10-304(f)
(2020).
28
E.g., N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2 cl. 3; Fla. Const. art. V,
§ 15; Utah Const. art. VIII, § 4; Ark. Const. amend.

28.
E.g., Okla. Stat. tit. 5, § 13 (1939); Tex. Gov’t Code §
82.021 (1987); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 36-2-1 (1941); D.C.
Code § 11-2501 (1970); Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.910
(2020).
30
E.g., State v. Cook, 525 P.2d 761, 763–64 (Wash.
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